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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Public administration in developing countries seems to be
evolving a tradition of its own, making the career bureaucrat the
"master" of policy and his Minister its purveyor. In Nigeria, as in
other developing countries, particularly those in Africa, the bureau-
cracy has a near monopoly on technical expertise, and benefits from
the prestige that goes to the professional expert in a society aiming
toward industrialization and economic growth. Groups capable of
competing for political influence or of imposing close controls over
bureaucracy are few and far between, so that often it is able to move
into a partial power vacuum.
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
The focus of this paper is the role of public administrators in
public policy formulation in Nigeria. We will attempt to trace the
shifts in bureaucratic policy-making roles and relationships which
occurred in the First Republic period, under different military
regimes, and immediately following the return to civilian rule in
1979. Although Nigerian administrators have always participated in
the determination of public policy, the exercise has often fluctuated
with the rising tide of political, structural, and legal changes at
the federal, state and local levels. The prospect that more funda-
mental changes will be forthcoming in the nature and extent of
administrative involvement in public policy formation and execution is
2then explored in the context of past and current social, political,
and economic development.
Before proceeding with this paper, however, it is important that
we take note of the common administrative patterns in developing areas
and the attendant ideology of development. These characteristics are
considered "typical" in the sense of their prevalence or recurrence
rather than their uniform and identical existence in all of these
polities. We should also consider the basic expectationa1 role
usually held concerning the proper character and conduct of bureaucra-
cies in developing countries.
The significance of administration is almost universally acknow-
ledged among writers on the problems of development. Usually, an
effective bureaucracy coupled with a vigorous modernizing elite are
an essential prerequisite of development, but effective administration
has been a neglected factor of development and the existing machinery
for management of developments in most developing countries is
grossly inadequate.
COMMON ADMINISTRATIVE PATTERNS
Knowledge of the political and administrative process in the
developing countries is fragmentary and tentative. It is nevertheless
possible on the basis of recent surveys of the political experience
of developing nations,l supplemented by more speculative formulations
of political activity in such societies 2 to identify some of the
common features of the politics of development.
The basic pattern of public administration in developing areas
3is imitative rather than indigenous. 3 All countries, including
those that escaped Western colonialization, have consciously tried
to introduce some version of modern Western bureaucratic administra-
tion. Usually, it is patterned after a particular national
administrative model, perhaps with incidental features borrowed from
some other system. A country that was formerly a colony almost
certainly will resemble the "parent" country administratively, even
though independence has been won and political 'apron strings' have
been cut. Kingsley has vividly described how "the organization of
offices, the demeanor of the civil servants, even the general
appearance of a bureau, strikingly mirror the national characteristics
of the former colonial powers".4
Perhaps the most significant and by far the most troubling of the
problem of development is that of deficiencies in skilled manpower
,
necessary for a developmental program. There are shortages of trained
administrators with management capacity, developmental skills and
technical competence in most developing countries. Although this
usually reflects an inadequate educational system, it is not
necessarily equivalent to a deficit of holders of university degrees,
but of men and women sufficiently groomed in the art and craft of
public administration.
Also, the bureaucracy in developing countries has a strong
tendency to emphasize orientations that are dialectically opposed to
effective production. That is, much bureaucratic activity is
channelled toward the realization of goals other than the achievement
of program objectives. Riggs refers to this as "a preference among
bureaucrats for personal expediency as against public principled
Colonialism was
4
interests".5 It may take a variety of forms, most of which are not
unique by any means to these bureaucracies, but which may only be
more prominent in bureaucratic behavior in a transitional setting.
In his analysis of administration in developing nations, Ferrel
Heady noted that the bureaucracy of a developing country "is apt to
have a generous measure of operational autonomy which can be
accounted for by the convergence of several forces usually at work
. tl . d d d' . ." 61n a recen y 1n epen ent rna ern1z1ng nat10n
essentially rule by bureaucracy with policy guidance from remote
sources, and this pattern persists even after the bureaucracy has a
new master in the nation.
IDEOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT
The developing countries share a generalized consensus of the
objectives toward which change should be directed. This "ideology
of development" is crucial to an understanding of the politics and
administration in these countries. To begin with, it ought to be
realized that developing countries are societies caught in the midst
of tremendous social change, striving to reach social goals of
demanding complexity and working under great pressures for early
accomplishment. Put in terms of "models" of societies which are
often used for purposes of analysis, they are moving from the
traditional toward the modern type, from what Fred Riggs called
"Agraria" toward "industria". 7 They are in transition, no longer
traditional and not yet modern, either as they view themselves or as
others view them.
5Nevertheless, effective administration is crucial to the
materialization of the two of goals of development, which are nation-
building and socio-economic progress. Esman describes nation-building
as "the deliberate fashioning of an integrated political community
within fixed geographic boundaries in which nation state is the
dominant political institution" 8 The urge to seek national identity
is probably in part a reaction to escape from colonialism, expressing
a desire to emulate the nationhood of the former colonial power
once independence has been gained. Actual achievement of nationhood
in most of the emerging nations has not been an easy accomplishment.
In the case of the democratic societies of the west, the movement
toward nationalism was largely one of uniting poeple already speaking
a single language under one government. In contrast, most of the
developing countries are artificial entities in the sense that they
are the products of colonial activity rather than of a pre-existing
political loyalty. Their boundaries likewise are often drawn by
imperial power without regard to ethnic groupings, excluding people
with close cultural ties and including minority groups opposed to
assimilation. These problems are especially acute in Africa, where
few of what have normally been considered prerequisites of national
"d" " 9l entlty eXlsts.
The related goal of social and economic progress in the ideology
of development may be equally hard to achieve, but it is somewhat
more tangible and measurable. Esman identifies it as "the sustained
and widely diffused improvement in material and social welfare".lO
The desire to triumph over poverty and to distribute the benefits of
industrialization generally in the society are powerful motivations
6to people just becoming aware of what is possible as demonstrated
by the developed nations, including those with democratic and with
totalitarian political orientations.
The ideology of development sets the sights for political and
administrative action, but it does not specify the exact form of the
machinery for either politics or administration. As Merghani
observes ". . there is a general inclination toward a strong
government, a strong executive, and a high degree of centralization,"
on the assumption that "without a strong government and a strong
leadership the task of national unity and rapid economic and social
transformation becomes difficult if not impossible". ll Beyond this,
the mood is one that favors experimentation and adaptation from the
successful experience of developed countries, whatever may have been
the political paths followed.
DEVELOPING BUREAUCRACIES - MASTER OR AGENT
Apart from political instability, the political role of bureau-
cracy is probably the most consequential issue befuddling the political
future of developing countries. With few exceptions, however, there
is common agreement transcending differences in political ideology,
culture and style, that bureaucracy should be basically instrumental
in its operation, that it should serve as agent and not as master. It
is universally expected that the bureaucracy should be so designed and
shaped as to respond willingly and effectively to policy leadership
from outside its own ranks. The idea that bureaucratic officialdom
should for any extended period of time constitute the ruling class
7in a political system is generally rejected. The political elite
may include members of the civil or military bureaucracies, but
should not consist exclusively or even primarily of bureaucratic
officials. Of course, this is not the same as asserting that the
bureaucracy can or should play strictly an instrumental role,
uninvolved in policy making and uncontaminated by exposure to the
political process. A consensus on the way things ought to be does not
necessarily ensure that they will actually be that way.
A perennial concern relating to bureaucracies is the possibility
that they may stray from their instrumental role to become the primary
power-wielders in the political system. The political role of the
bureaucracy has been a matter of continuing interest in the more
developed nations, and has emerged as one of the principal issues in
discussions about the political future of developing nations. There
are views that represent the negative judgement regarding the implica-
tions of what is taken to be a typical bureaucratic role in developing
polities; while other equally informed expressions are considered
more sanguine. Those who advocate a less stringent control of
bureaucracy in developing countries do not deny the tendency for the
bureaucracy to occupy what seems by the standards in developed polities
to be an inordinately strong position relative to other political
organs, but they are inclined to regard this as inevitable, perhaps
desirable, and at any rate not easily susceptible to external
manipulation.
Among those who argue most vehemently against bureaucratic
dominant political power positions are LaPalombara, Riggs, and Henry
Goodnow. They argued that a politically dominant bureaucracy is a
8pronounced potential threat to balanced political development,
particularly if development is to be in the direction of representa-
tive democracy. LaPalombara feels that the difficulty in restricting
bureaucracy to an instrumental role, not sufficiently embraced in
even the Western democracies, which have structurally differentiated
political systems, is accentuated in developing nations
. . . where the bureaucracy may be the most
coherent power center and where, in addition,
the major decisions regarding national
development are likely to involve authoritative
rule making and rule application by
governmental structures. 12
The result in many places is the emergence of "overpowering bureau-
cracies," with the growth in bureaucratic power inhibiting, and
perhaps precluding, the development of democratic policies. LaPalombara
therefore, suggested that if democratic development is to be
encouraged, a separation of political and administrative roles is
required; and this calls for deliberate steps to limit the power of
13the bureaucracies in many of the newer states.
Riggs, in his case study of Thailand states that transitional
societies lack balance between "political policy-making institutions
and bureaucratic policy-implementating structures," the consequence
being that "the political function tends to be appropriated in
14
considerable measure, by bureaucrats". On the assumption that the
imposition of constitutional control over a bureaucracy is a
difficult task as the bureaucracy becomes relatively more powerful,
he reco~~ends that deliberate measures be taken to curtail bureaucratic
expansion and to strengthen potential control agencies.
Goodnow, in his study of the civil service in Pakistan, concludes
9that the occupants of the higher civil service posts do indeed exert
such predominant influence as to make the climate unfavorable for
d 1 f d .... 15eve opment 0 emocratlc lnstltutlons. He attributes this to the
fact that they "fell heir to the instrumentalities of power" vacated
by the colonial administrators, and were able easily to convert
governmental institutions created to permit rule by a foreign
bureaucratic elite to the service of a native bureaucratic elite.
Goodnow concedes that they have usually taken over with some reluc-
tance, have often been sincere in blaming the shortcomings of
politicians for making this necessary, and have regarded themselves
as guardians of democracy as an ultimate goal; but he feels that the
urge to hold and consolidate power is deceptively strong. Therefore,
Goodnow is skeptical about the prospects of a gradual transition from
bureaucratic elite rule to democratic government, and foresees as
more likely a power struggle between an increasingly rigid governing
bureaucracy and an increasingly revolutionary opposition, which will
destroy prospects for evolutionary change.
Among those who proclaim a more sanguine view of strong bureau-
cratic foothold in development initiation and administration are:
Milton J. Esman, Ralph Braibanti, and Bernard E. Brown. Braibanti
affirmed that given the high priority assigned to economic development
in the new nations, during the early stages
. . . what virtue there is seems to reside
in the bureaucracy. Economic development
must be achieved in the matrix of construc-
ting an equilibrium of bureaucratic power
and political control. This must be done
even though development requirements are
inherently antagonistic to the political
results of the very equilibrium which
10
will eventuate. The achievement in disequilibrium
of a condition of development which the logic of
popular sovereignity demands be achieved in an
unattainable equilibrium is the crucial problem
in political development. 16
Esman and Brown argued that rather than downgrading the system, it
should be strengthened. Esman emphasized the central and growing role
of administrative institutions in carrying out action programs, but he
does not think that bureaucrats as a group are political risk takers,
or that they are likely to contest for political leadership.17 Brown
mentions the tendencies for political power to shift to the executive
sector of government, and within the executive, from political offi-
cials to professional civil servants; he acknowledged that this raises
a question concerning the future of democratic government, but never-
theless feels that the pressing need is to strengthen the executive
branch. "The dangers of a bureaucracy that is not adequately controlled
are real. They cannot be eliminated but may be reduced by trying to
make bureaucracy more representative of the society, to provide built-in
18
checks and balances".
This sampling illustrates the variety in judgements regarding
central tendencies in evolution of the bureaucratic role in developing
countries, and the difference of opinion concerning what corrective
action, if any should be taken. Nearly all of these general assess-
ments state what is considered "typical" for developing countries as a
group, and do not go far in making distinctions among them. When
prescriptive recommendations are made, they are directed toward
improving the prospects for development along pluralistic competitive
political lines, with balanced power among political institutions
a feature of such development. Bureaucracy in developing countries is
11
for the most part, appraised from this perspective.
CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL AND STRUCTURAL ORIGINS
The public service of Nigeria derives historically from the
colonial service of the United Kingdom. Although an account of that
service rationale, recruitment and record are beyond my terms of
reference here, it is necessary to take notice of its former presence
and policies. Nigeria became independent in 1960, and changes took
place at a remarkable speed. The time span since independence has
been so short that it is impossible to understand the present role
of public administrators without reference to Nigeria's historical
development. There are several reasons for this. First, the very
nature of the immediate past has led to the traditions, structuring,
training and espirit of the Nigerian public services being by and
large modelled on the British pattern. Secondly, given the recent
date of independence, the Nigerian public services have not yet had
time to rethink and re-orientate their philosophy or to infuse it--
supposing such were the wish--with a tangible African content and
spirit. Thirdly, because there persists within the public service a
considerable measure of pride in its claim to be following in the
steps of what is often acknowledged as the premier civil service
(the British administrative system), Nigeria along with many other
countries in Anglophone Africa, but in contrast with some other
emergent states, counts among the greatest contributions to its
successful process of nation-building the heritage of a sound civil
service, both in the calibre and loyalty of its personnel and in no
less important status as a national institution.
13
ADMINISTRATION IN THE COLONIAL PERIOD
Colonial rule has varied connotations and can be described in
various terms. To some it is synonymous with exploitation; to
others it is liberation in that it develops the latent abilities of
colonial peoples. Further still, to some it is authoritarian; to
others socialistic; however, all must agree on one point: in essence
it is bureaucratic not necessarily in the way day-to-day decisions
are made, but as a whole, for individual officials in the field,
particularly in remote areas, exercise considerable freedom of judge-
ment. Coleman describes colonialism in Africa as '~ureaucratic
authoritarianism controlled by an elite of the 'elect'. Government
was regarded as 'administration' and people were the 'administrees,,,.19
It is a system of authority which is its own justification; it exists
in response to decisions made elsewhere than in the political life
of the people governed.
In the colonial territory, the civil servant is above politics
in that neither his position nor his actions are determined by them.
Thus the common heritage of all states which have emerged from colonial
status is necessarily the heritage of an era during which the focus
of power was the governmental bureaucracy. This situation can be and
is being modified in a variety of ways in the new nations, but for all
former colonial dependencies it is the inevitable point of departure
for their national life. Indeed, the very existence of such "nations"
as Nigeria, is itself the product of colonial bureaucracy.
Nonetheless, we cannot recount the process of colonial administra-
tion in Nigeria without reference to the principle of 'indirect rule'.
14
The theory of indirect rule as developed by Lord Lugard in Nigeria
held that the British government should have no interest in ruling
the native population directly, but should simply provide the frame-
work of sanctions which would guarantee the continued rule of the
t d ·· 1 1 1 h" b . .] . f . . 20ra ltlona oca aut orltles su Ject to certaln qua.l lcatlons.
Such approach had two alleged advantages; (a) it was much cheaper
than direct rule, and Britain was interested in keeping the costs of
colonial administration to a minimum, and (b) it did less violence
to the lives and psyches of the governed, which additionally helped
to keep down the costs of administration, since leaving traditional
ways undisturbed would make the native population more docile and
thus less expensive to police; they also would be less likely to
demand costly new social services.
Indirect rule reinforced the myth of the civil servant as above
the political struggle. The British official could not be accused of
interfering in local politics if he simply backed up the local Emir
or Chief in doing the things the local ruler had always done. The
local Emir or Chief himself, in theory at least, is above factional
struggles, and simply applied rather than created tribal custom.
Indirect rule tended, therefore, to confirm the idea of a ruling
bureaucracy above the political struggle--the invisibility of the
bureaucracy.
PERSISTENCE OF COLONIAL ADMINISTRATIVE STRUC~URE
The British administrative practices and conventions have heavily
influenced the ways in which higher civil servants have been involved
15
in public policy making in Nigeria. In the first place, the broadly
defined role assumed by administrative officers in policy formula-
tion and in the provision even of political advice can be seen as a
legacy of a colonial system of government. In the words of Ferkiss,
"executive initiative and dominance is implicit in the British
parlimentary as well as the colonial tradition".2l
After attainment of independence, a ministerial conception of
government structure, under which appointed career officials are
found in virtually all posts in the upper reaches of the hierarchy
(except as ministers) and therefore control most of the key positions
in the decision making process, was sustained as the prevailing model
of administrative organization. This structural arrangement enabled
extensive bureaucratic involvement in policy formulation, advocacy,
and execution. Finally, Nigerian officials readily embraced a norm
of administrative behavior which not only permits, but expects high
ranking public servants will both take the initiative in developing
public policy alternatives and implementation strategies and in
advising their ministers "on the full implications of policy open to
22the Government".
To demonstrate the extent to which Nigeria embraced the British
administrative system, we only need to take a look at the officially
prescribed role of the higher public servant. Although the role was
greatly modified following the establishment of self-government, the
principle still remained the same. In place of the former colonial
pattern, the British home civil service was taken as the official
model for Nigeria's public services. This is made quite clear in the
following statement, taken from an official document distributed by
In a one party state, this assumption of the neutrality of
16
the former Government of Eastern Nigeria:
The Public Service of Eastern Nigeria is an
independent autonomous service established under
the Nigeria (constitution) Order in Council 1960.
It shall be scrupulously insulated from partisan
politics, and observe the highest standards
and traditions as evolved in Britain, on whose
system our own has largely been modelled. It
must be a disciplined, efficient and loyal
service, impartial in the exercise of its duties
and devoted to serving the Government in power.
While essentially the executive arm of the
Government it will be expected to give honest
help and advice in the formulation of policy,
and to ensure that approved policies are faith-
fully, energetically and wholeheartedly carried
out. 23
Although this statement refers to the entire public service, it
applies more to the higher public servants than the lower levels of
the bureaucracy. Sir Ivor Jennings maintains that the "task of the
politician is not to govern but to supervise government, to take
decisions on questions of principle submitted to him and to ensure a
close relation between public opinion and the process of administra-
t
. ,,24lon.
the civil service may be rejected,25 but in Nigeria the philosophy
of J.S. Mill has so far largely been retained:
A most important principle of good government
in a popular constitution is that no executive
functionaries should be appointed by popular
election; neither by the votes of the people 26
themselves nor by those of their representatives.
CHAPTER III
THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE - FIRST REPUBLIC MODELS
Under the Whitehall model, and as adopted by Nigeria, the
permanent secretary serves as the chief administrative officer and
the chief advisor to the Minister. As paramount advisor, the perma-
nent secretary is to engage in the elaboration of the policies or
plans and to assist in the determination of the best means of carrying
them out. The permanent secretary (p.s.) is to translate policies,
coordinate ministry activities, supervise functional execution and
monitor results, defend ministry budget proposals, uphold the
ministry I S interests in inter-ministerial meetings and in relations
with other agencies and external groups, and "causing research work
to be done for the ministry, seeking legal, technical and specialized
d · f h .. ,,27a Vlce or t e mlnlstry
In practice, Nigerian administrators have played more than an
advisory role in the process of public policy formation. Adebayo
comments, "ministerial experience in Nigeria. particularly during the
civilian regime, has not largely followed the path of conventional
28
relation between political boss and his permanent secretary". He
maintains that the "average" politician, especially in the first
republic; conceived of his role as approving or disapproving whatever
proposals or recommendations were placed before him by his permanent
29
secretary. Policy papers authored and initiated by permanent
secretaries often formed the basis of Executive Council deliberation
and sanction, and career administrators drafted and tightly control-
led ministry and agency budgets. Adebayo sums it up when he says:
In sum, higher civil servants
18
"policy making in Nigeria public administration from independence in
1960 until the take over by the military in January, 1966 was largely
, h h d f h . 'I " 30In t e an sot e ClVl servants.
have been central, and often dominant participants in the policy for-
mation process since the early stages of Nigeria's political history.
REASONS OFFERED FOR THE SITUATION
An observer is likely to wonder why in Nigeria as in many other
developing countries the bulk of the political heads of departments
are unable to function effectively in the conventional role of policy
maker. The reasons are not far fetched. Firstly, Nigeria became
independent at a time when the literacy rate was low; as a result
individuals with very limited educational background emerged as
Ministers. It is no exaggeration to say that some of these politicians
have been little better than illiterates. In terms of awareness
therefore, they are not more informed than the people they were
supposedly leading--the general public. A Nigerian proverb which
says, in the country of the blind, one eyed man is the king, is very
much relevant. The political heads notion of ministerial appointment
and responsibility was that of a ceremonial head in a department whose
only duty was to wear costly apparels to office, and to "sit back and
wait for any files to come from the permanent secretary for his appro-
val, and when such files are not flowing, he is likely to suspect
d ' 1 1 'ff' , h f h' ff" I " 31lS oya ty or lne _lclency on t e part 0 lS 0 . lela s ,
Another reason for the failure to act decisively is to be found
in the political head's role relations with members of the public. In
19
Nigeria, the demands made upon the politician by the less fortunate
kinsmen often reach onerous proportions. The prevailing sentiment
seems to be that those who have made good are expected to help those
who remain behind. Thus, the Minister may spend a substantial propor-
tion of his salary on the school fees of junior brothers or the support
of elderly kinsmen living in the traditional family home. Moreover,
rural relatives expect their elite 'sons' and 'brother' to help them
secure government scholarships and employment. For example, a relative
of a minister who finds it necessary to go to a government office will
surely ask his kinsmen in politics to intercede for him with the
office in question. Such 'service' greatly taxes the time of the mini-
ster and interferes with his own duties--not to mention the fact that
they are an infringement upon the ethic of not using one's official
position to secure favorable treatment for relatives and friends,
Tribal loyalties, much like extended family ties, do not appear
to have weakened in proportion to the acceptance of new norms in
other sectors of social life. The uniqueness of one's tribal groups is
instilled in Nigerians at an early age, and later reinforced by the
individual's own perception of the immediately obvious differences of
language, religion, and custom which differentiate the various ethnic
communities. The tragic events of recent years (the civil war, for
instance) have given ample proof of the importance of tribal loyalties
and prejudices among all sectors of Nigerian society.
Apart from the problem of personal deficiencies or drawbacks
afflicting the political heads of department during the first republic,
there was the pattern of decision making inherent in the system which
gave civil servants the initiative in decision making. For example,
20
the preparation of the budget was an exercise conducted almost
entirely by the civil servants. The content and formulation of budget
was practically the handiwork of civil servants. 32
This sort of situation leaves no alternative but for the permanent
secretary to take the initiative. After all, as Herbert Morrison
once remarked, it is better that a department should be run by its
civil servants than it should not be run at all. 33 Thus the political
situation in Nigeria was such that a favorable situation was created
for bureaucrats to gain a strong foothold in policy making during the
first republic. The execution of public policies was in principle an
exclusive preserve of the bureaucrats. However, some political figures
showed scant regard for this convention. Allegations that First
Republic ministers often interfered with details of administrative
activity for political or personal purposes have been widely voiced.
According to critics, ministerial intervention in the policy imple-
mentation realm "subverted professional criteria in decision making,
impaired administrative efficiency, promoted frustration and resent-
ment within the bureaucracy and further accentuated role conflicts
between political and administrative class officers".34
INDEPENDENCE AND THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES
Before Nigeria's independence, and shortly thereafter, each of
the three regions (West, East, North) was dominated by strong party
government since regionalization in 1954. The enthusiasm and dyna-
mism which motivated each party to power produced virile governments
which were masters in their regions both as to policy and substance
21
of government. Therefore, between the period of regionalization in
1954 and the threshold of independence in 195~, the political leaders
in the regions were indeed masters of policy and they dictated the
pace and direction of government. Adebayo states that
introduction of the Free primary ed~cation
in the Western Region; the reforms in local
government system in the Eastern Region;
the bold measures towards Nigerianization of
the civil service in the various Regions ..•
were all the handiwork of the political party
in power in each of the Regions. 35
However, the situation turned around for the parties from the
dawn of independence until the end of the civil administration in 1966.
The political parties' open struggle for federal power and supremacy
became pronounced and bitter, and little effort was left for party
government to concentrate on affairs of public administration. The
situation degenerated to a point where memoranda and policy papers
presented at Executive Councils were initiated by civil servants. 36
The political heads had little or no time for the supervision of the
ministry or affairs of government.
At the federal level, the situation was somewhat different, in
terms of the control and influence the bureaucrats had over policy
matters. The condition that presented itself at the Federal level
was that of uneasy coalition government which prevented the formula-
tion of sustained and consistent policy as a result of insufficient
agreement at the political level. It is natural under this condition,
that civil servants became the mainspring of policy. Administration
has a way of taking advantage of weak political control and in the
presence of a weak political consensus, administration tends to take
over and assume control of policy. The federal permanent secretaries
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enjoyed this dominant role in relation to their established functions
until the military took over. As a matter of fact, this policy
domination role established during the civilian administration was
carried further into the military administration.
The First Republic was a short-lived period in the annals of
Nigeria. Before Nigerians were able to savor the taste of independence,
the country was engulfed in political internecine war that led to a
state of near anomie, and the freedom we struggled for, but received
on a 'platter of gold' was almost destroyed in the process. Such was
the situation when the military took control on January 15, 1966.
CHAPTER IV
THE MILITARY REGIMES AND DECISION MAKING
Under the military administration (1966-1979), the formal policy
making authority was the exclusive preserve of the Supreme Military
Council (SMC) , a body composed of 24 ranking military officers
including the Head of the Federal Military Government and Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces (long-winded title for 'Head of State'), and
the Supreme Headquarters Chief of Staff. The military and civilian
appointed commissioners (ministers) that served as heads of ministries
make up the Federal Executive Council (FEC) and the body was
responsible for overseeing policy execution and coordination of
governmental programs.
The most significant feature of the military regimes is that
decision making was highly personalized at the state and federal
37levels. The reason for this is no doubt due to the military's
concept of their role in government. From the inception of the
military regime in Nigeria, it was basically accepted that the task
of running the government was the sole responsibility of the military,
and that where the Executive Councils had been established, their
role was merely advisory. This arrangement was given a constitu-
tional sanction with the promulgation of Decree #1 of 1966 which
vested all executive powers of the state in the military governors.
The military administration also introduced new innovations into
the administrative structure of Nigeria, with the creation of the
post of the secretary to the military government and head of the
civil service (SMC) at the apex of the federal and state bureaucratic
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hierarchies. The appointees possessed unrivalled access to the head
of state and military governors, and by virtue of their positions
served as secretary to the federal and state executive councils. The
secretary to the military governors, who was often dubbed as 'super
perm sec,' exercised important supervisory powers over the top ranks
of the civil service. In addition, they were privileged to sit in
most supreme military council meetings and also served as chief
advisors to the military leadership.
More than the civilian administration was able to achieve in the
short time between independence and the overthrow of government, the
military administration was able to centralize control over state
government operation. In achieving this, the military governors were
empowered to appoint more permanent secretaries to newly created posts
within their office. According to Adebayo,
... some state governments during 1966-75
had as many as seven permanent secretaries
concentrated in the office of the military
governor . . . responsible to the governor
for almost the entire range of governmental
activities - economic, administrative jpolitical, commercial and industrial. 8
In another comment on the practice, Adamo1ekun said that in 1977 nine
permanent secretaries served as heads of cabinet office departments
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and units at the federal government level. In sum, the practice had
the effect of reconstituting a powerful secretariat office and
reducing authority and range of functional responsibilities possessed
by ministries and departments.
Contrary to military administrative conventions, Nigerian military
leaders drew the bureaucrats even deeper into policy formulating roles.
General Ironsi, Nigeria's first military leader, never appointed
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civilian commissioners (he kept former surviving politicians out of
government positions entirely), and he relied heavily on the permanent
secretaries; virtually all important decisions were taken by a narrow
group of half a dozen military leaders, together with a handful of
civil servant advisors. In the absence of commissioners, General
I 'd ' 1 'h d 1 'C 'I 40ronSl veste ministerla powers In t e Fe era Executlve ounCl.
Nevertheless, the Head of the Military Government and the Federal
Executive Council delegated broad authority to promulgate subsidiary
statutes as well as extensive rule making powers to the permanent
secretaries, who acted as the de facto political heads of their
ministries.
By all accounts, the direct involvement of public servants in
policy making reached its peak during General Gowon's administration.
Lack of experience on the part of most military officers with govern-
mental processes and public decision making, coupled with a
reluctance to appoint former politicians to authoritative or advisory
posts in the new regime and the absence of any organized public
constituency, made the military administration dependent upon the
policy advice and alternatives proffered by civil servants.
Under the administration of General Gowon, policy advising,
formulating, initiating, advocating and defending was the paramount
preoccupation of the permanent secretaries. Gowon encouraged
officials to attend meetings and participate fully in SMe delibera-
tions. His style of administration was given credit as a contributory
factor to the dominant influence of federal permanent secretaries.
Gowon was reported to have relied heavily on suggestions made by
federal permanent secretaries and the secretaries to the military
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governors, rather than on recommendations tendered by his commis-
sioners or the military officers serving on the SMC. 41 As an
indication of the extent of the power possessed by high level public
administrators, Adebayo reports that state military governors would
travel to the Lagos residences of federal permanent secretaries in
order to lobby for their support on matters "that might in due course
come before the supreme military council, the FEC or even directly
before the head of state. 42
Gowon's convention of joint authorship with the chief executive
of memoranda coming before the SMC practically guaranteed that the
policy memoranda advanced by public servants would not be substantially
changed by the council. Moreover, 'super perm sec' and other top-level
civil servants overtly usurped the powers of their ministers and
dominated both the shaping and determining of government policies and
the allocation of public resources. Major General Joseph N. Garba
(retired) confirmed on the eve of the return to civilian rule in 1979,
that during the nine years of the Gowon regime, senior civil servants
literally held sway over decision making, and some of them could in
f t 1 th ' " d t wl'th l't. 43ac overru e elr commlSSloner an ge away
With the abolition of all elected political offices and civilian
cabinets, administrative officers found themselves directly account-
able to the military leadership. Under the Gowan regime, in
particular, many career civil servants took, at least covertly,
advantage of the opportunity provided by the replacement of
politicians with military men (who shared common administrative values
and depended upon their support and expertise), to expand their
already powerful role in determing public policies. According to
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Aliyu. "Decision making in all spheres of governmental activity.
including the formulation and implementation of policies and
allocation of resources tended to reflect the preferences and values
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of bureaucracy". However. Gowon's policy of more direct civil
servants' involvement in running the affairs of state eventually led
to dissension within officer ranks of the armed forces based on the
perception that the military bore the onus of responsibility for
policies primarily shaped by civil servants. Role expansion concomi-
tantly drew top administrative officers into an increasing number of
conflicts with army officers and more tightly linked their position
and the reputation of the public services to the fate of the ruling
military faction with whom they had forged an alliance.
The consequence of the dissension among the military hierarchy.
and the general malaise in the society at the time. led to the
replacement of General Gowon in a bloodless coup during one of his
many trips to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit meeting
held in Kampala. Uganda in July. 1975. General Murtala Mohammed's
(replaced by General Olusegun Obasanjo on February 13. 1976. after an
abortive coup that claimed the life of Murtala Mohammed) regime came
into power with a sense of purpose and an unprecedented dynamism -- a
mission to uplift the morale of the country and to rid the public
service of the so-called 'dead woods'. On the heels of the July. 1975
coup. General Mohammed removed all 12 military governors and most
federal commissioners. Within a year. more than 10.000 civil
servants. including high level administrative officers who had been
closely linked to the Gowan regime. had been dismissed from federal
and state ministries and parastatals in an unprecedented. sweeping
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purge of all ranks in the public service. In the Nigerian case,
widespread recognition that higher civil servants had become the
dominant actors in the policy making arena only heightened their
vulnerability to dismissal or involuntary retirement on grounds of
corruption, inefficiency, or disloyalty. General Murta1a also
immediately banned permanent secretaries from Supreme Military Council
and Federal Executive Council meetings unless specifically invited to
attend and participate.
Nevertheless, high level public servants continued to be preoccu-
pied with policy formulation under the new regime. Their involvement
in the policy making process assumed less conspicuous forms. During
this time, appointed ministers continued to lack a popular base of
political support. In the absence of political parties, career
officials easily resisted the demands placed on the bureaucracy by
weak and fragmented interest groups. Regular, nationwide meetings of
SMGs and permanent secretaries also served to enhance their policy
intitiating role under the Murta1a/Obasanjo regime. The increasing
importance placed on the kinds of professional expertise and informa-
tion controlled by public administrators strengthened their strategic
position in the policy formation process, although frequent rotation
and relative high turnover among permanent secretaries and other high
ranking administrative officers continued to place limits on their
ability to claim possession of specialist knowledge and experience in
" . . h' 1 d .. 45sltuatlons requlrlng tec nlca eClSlons. General Obasanjo's 1977
government .
affirmation that the "role of the civil servants is to initiate
policies and to offer professional and technical advice to the
,,46 implies the lack of fundamental changes in the
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prevailin~ norms and expectations and indeed suggested the new
administration's inadvertent return to pre-1966 administrative
practices.
Further evidence that administrators continued to determine
public policies throughout the military rule period is provided by an
investigation of council-staff relations at the local government level.
In principle, the 1976 local government reform greatly circumscribed
the role of the chief administrative officer (secretary) by assigning
nearly exclusive authority over local policy formulation to the
council. Many local government secretaries, however, continued in
the 1976-1979 period to view their roles in the familiar terms of the
resident or divisional officer and, therefore, endeavored to dominate
the policy making process. At the same time, many councilors remained
satisfied to ratify proposals initiated and submitted by the secretary
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and/or department heads.
CHAPTER V
THE SECOND REPUBLIC DEVELOPMENTS AND 1979 CONSTITUTION
The new Nigerian constitution of 1979 brought into focus an
endeavor to break from the past in terms of administrative structure
and practices. For the first time an attempt was made to establish
political control over the bureaucracy through the constitution. The
Second Republic Constitution substantially undermined the formal
standing of higher civil servants in both policy formulation and policy
execution. Constitutional provisions (Articles 139 and 177) authori-
zing the appointment of special advisors to the president and the
governors, as well as a secretary to the government who is expected
to serve as the overall political advisor to the chief executive, added
powerful non-career competitors with whom permanent secretaries and
the head of service must vie when attempting to influence decision
making. Special advisors hold temporary political rather than civil
service appointments and serve 'at the pleasure of' the president/
governor. The authority and influence of the special advisor rivals
or exceeds that exercised by many federal minister/state commissioners.
Furthermore, permanent secretaries no longer serve as the administra-
tive heads of their ministries. Federal ministers and state
commissioners were delegated this responsibility as the representatives
of the chief executive under Articles 136 and 174 of the 1979
constitution.
Most fundamentally, the 1979 constitution altered the status of
the top echelon of the public bureaucracy by allowing elected chief
executives to appoint individuals from outside the career civil
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service as permanent secretaries, heads of extra-ministerial depart-
ments, and secretary to the government (Articles 157, 188). With the
return to civilian rule, the newly elected chief executives made
sweeping personnel changes in these ranks. A number of individuals
from outside the civil service (most notably from the universities)
were appointed permanent secretary or secretary to the government,
particularly in certain state governments, although the majority of
initial appointees were civil servants. These appointments do not
require legislative consent, a provision which implicitly grants the
chief executive power to transfer and remove from office those
individuals serving as permanent secretaries, heads of departments,
secretary to the government, and head of the civil service. According
to Aliyu, "the power granted to the president/governor to appoint and
remove all top supervisory officials in the public bureaucracy
directly has greatly circumscribed the authority of civil service
. . ,,48
comm1.SS1.ons .
The only constitutional restraint placed on the exercise of the
president's power of appointment with respect to these offices is the
requirement to "have regard to the federal character of Nigeria and
the need to promote national unity". Governors must "have regard to
the diversity of the people within the State and the need to promote
national unity". Furthermore, "there shall be no predominance of
persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or sectional groups in
that government or in any of its agencies" [Articles 14(3,4), 135(3),
157(5), 173(2), 188(4)]. The federal character clause (still in
practice) is likely to encourage public servants in certain states to
transfer to the center, to result in the recruitment of additional
appointments .
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candidates from outside the civil services into high-level posts, and
to provide rapid avenues for advancement in individual cases.
Major variations emerged during the second republic in federal
and state government appointment policies and practices, staffing
patterns, and administrative rule making and interpretation. For
instance, all permanent secretaries were appointed to specific offices
in some states, while individuals in other states were formally appoin-
ted to the grade or cadre of permanent secretary with no office
specified. Some other state governments adopted a mixed system, under
which some permanent secretaries were appointed to specified offices
and others undesigned posts (e.g., within the Governor's office).
Considerable variations also exists in the number of permanent
secretaries assigned to the Governor's office and to particular
ministries. In some states, permanent secretaries were appointed to
certain boards or directorates. A variety of other high-level posts
were selected on the rare occasions when state governors exercised
their power to appoint 'chief executives of department'. Thus, it
was clear that in critical appointment and staffing matters, as well
as in the distribution of public policy making roles, state govern-
ments possessed sufficient latitude in applying provisions of the 1979
constitution to embark on different approaches in response to local
circumstances and preferences. The eagerness with which government
pursued such opportunities gave rise to greater diversity in
administrative practice within the federation and, in most states,
to the creation of a "much wider band of quasi political
,.49
Under the second republic, moreover, the primary criteria for
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appointment as permanent secretary became explicitly political
According to Ray Ofoegbu, "the critical bases for appointment now are
'competence, loyalty and total commitment,,,.50 These changes
constitute a decided shift away from British conventions of bureaucra-
tic neutrality and anonymity toward the deeper politicization of top
administrative ranks that characterizes the U.S. and French presidential
systems of government. As a condition for holding appointment in the
second republic, permanent secretaries, heads of extra-ministerial
departments, and secretaries to the government are "expected to pursue
with absolute commitment the manifestos, programs, and policies of the
h · f ." 51c le executlve.
More explicit po1iticization of the top echelons of the adminis-
trative machinery under Nigeria's multi-party political system increases
the likelihood that, upon assuming office in the future, newly elected
presidents and governors will replace incumbent permanent secretaries
and heads of departments (as well as the secretary to the government)
with fresh appointees of their own choosing. One would also expect
that a higher proportion of subsequent appointees to such posts will
be drawn from outside the career service in situations where the
civil service as a whole is perceived to have become politicized and
the newly elected governor/president is a member of a different
political party from the one to which the previous chief executive
belonged.
By 1980, numerous conflicts and considerable confusion arose over
the policy formulating role of permanent secretaries at the federal
and state levels. The controversy was so serious that the then
President (deposed in a military coup) felt compelled to invite all
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federal permanent secretaries to his official house for briefing.
On that occasion~ the President again emphasized that the presidential
system of government had placed new limits on the authority of civil
servants. However~ in a particular desperate situation~ the permanent
secretaries played even more prominent policy making and implementing
roles. During the 25 months political impasse in Kaduna state when
the majority party in the state's House of Assembly steadfastly
refused to approve or confirm any of the chief executive's (the
executive was from another party) nominees for commissioner~ permanent
secretaries performed all of the commissioner's functions. Higher
civil servants continued to exercise varying degrees of influence
over public policy formation in the other eighteen states. The 1979
election results offered state public servants an excellent opportunity
to negotiate legislative branch acquiescence with active bureaucratic
involvement in policy initiation. Many of their former colleagues,
who could be counted on to be sympathetic and cooperative, had been
elected to state legislatures. One preliminary study of the occupa-
tional backgrounds of persons elected to the house of assembly in
several states found that the former civil servants constituted
(including teachers) a majority of the legislators in some"states and
1 I , , h 52a p. ura lty In ot ers.
Taken together~ politicization of the upper ranks of the public
services and designation of ministers as chief executive officers
under the second republic constitution lead one to expect that
Dermanent secretaries increasingly will function in the capacity of
deputy ministers. Since the notion of permanent secretaries acting
as deputy ministers is basically consonant with prevailing
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conventions and prescriptions, this trend is unlikely in itself to
result in major de facto changes in the extent of administrative
involvement in public policy formulation and execution. The central
role which higher public servants have played in initiating alternative
policy proposals and in providing programmatic and political advice,
as well as the imnortance of ministerial ~articipation in the direction
of administrative affairs, would simply receive wider recognition and
attention under this arrangement.
There has always been considerable overlap in political and
administrative role performance at the upper levels of government in
Nigeria. A clear cut minister/deputy definition of roles both more
accurately reflects the dual nature of the functions which holders
of the two posts have tended to exercise in practice and effectively
underscores the critical place of hierarchical relations in the policy
making process. Reinforcing the latter principle constitutes a
particularly important component in efforts to prevent career adminis-
trators from reestablishing a dominant place in the policy making
arena.
OBJECTIVES AND RESULTS OF ADl1INISTRATIVE INVOLVEMENT IN POLICY MAKING
The conclusion that higher public servants have consistently
played central roles in the formulation and execution of public
policies and are likely to continue to act in these capacities in the
future does not provide a complete picture of administrative policy
making practice and prospects in Nigeria. This perspective can be
fruitfully enlarged through further inquiries concerning the
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objectives pursued by administrative decision makers and through
considered assessments of the impact of their involvement.
Within the twenty-five years of Nigeria's independence, bureau-
crats - especially higher level administrators - have constituted the
only political institution to exercise uninterrupted influence over
public policy formulation. Toward what ends have they applied their
extensive and persistent influence? What results can be attributed
to their action?
At critical junctures in Nigeria's young political history,
federal civil servants have demonstrated their commitments to the
concepts of a strong and effective central government. Public
servants have been credited for playing highly visible policy
shaping roles that are acknowledged to have encouraged successive
military regimes to create additional states out of the subnational
units that had comprised the federation,53 SOfie permanent secreta-
ries are also credited with intervening decisively to preserve and
extend the authority of the federal government vis-~-vis the
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states.
These actions are often mentioned in characterizing Nigerian
public bureaucracy as a unifying, dynamic and effective institution
dedicated to promoting political stability and national unity. But
an alternative interpretation regarding the motives behind adminis-
trative actions states that higher public servants have acted
primarily in selfish interests to enhance bureaucratic authority at
the center of the political system. A common criticism of the
bureaucratic involvement in policy making points out that
the image of the Nigerian civil service
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is full of intensive and extensive activities
determined by and directed towards the satis-
faction of the sectional and/or corporate
interests of the civil service in the
erroneous belief that what is good for the
civil service, its top members, or group of
them, is equally good for Nigeria. 55
Although details are still being worked out (I presume)
concerning the full extent of involvement, it is clear that public
servants nrovided vital support for other major public policy initia-
tives launched by the military. Included in this category are decree,
edicts, budget allocations affecting the ownership of business
enterprises, allocation of rural and urban land use rights, local
government jurisdictions, structure and function, wage and salary
levels, and agricultural development strategies. In each case,
independent analysts who have evaluated the impact of these measures
have discovered that government bureaucratic officers, consistently
emerged among the principal beneficiaries of policy execution and
program implementation.
For instance, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (NEDP)
of 1972 mandated that "by March, 1974, a range of economic activities,
then dominated to varying degrees by non-nationals, should be partly
or wholly owned by indigenes". The indigenization Degree (as it
became known) excluded aliens from the olvuership of small scale
domestic business operations and reouired 40 percent Nigerian
participation in the 36 types of large scale manufacturing, service,
processing, and commercial enterprises listed in its second schedule
(Decree No. 3 of 1977 expanded the scope of Schedule II and increased
the indigenous equity participation requirement to 60 percent
effective December 31, 1978).
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In furtherance of NEDP objectives, the federal government acquired
a 40 percent share in foreign owned commercial banks and insisted that
at least 40 percent of their total loans be allotted to indigenous
borrowers. It was alleged that public servants obtained a large
proportion of these loans and used their newly acquired capital to
purchase shares in second schedule firms at highly favorable prices.
Privileged access to information as well as credit enabled many
public officials to secure a place for themselves under NEDP provisions
at the 'core of the Nigerian share owning class' . 56 Aemergent
critic charged that the decree created "a class of indigenous mandarins
who combined political with economic power and influence and could,
therefore be more vicious in the exploitation of the country and the
common man than the foreigners they displaced".57
Career bureaucrats were also alleged to have further manipulated
state land allocation policies and procedures in ways that have
further entrenched their elite economic standing and expanded their
profit making opportunities. In recent years, public administrators
have shown particular interest and success in securing highly
desirable and valuable residential and commercial/industrial estate
holdings in major urban centers. Personal favoritism, inside
information and the ability to satisfy requirements that allocated
plots of land be 'developed' (i.e., built upon) within a relatively
short period of time have been effectively used by public servants
to accumulate urban land use rights for residential, rental and
b . 58USlness purposes.
Under the influence of higher civil servants, federal and state
authorities generally have pursued goals and projects that are remote
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from the basic needs of Nigerians, the majority of whom live in
rural areas. Much of Nigeria's oil wealth has been siphoned into
bureaucratic expansion, entrenchment, and enrichment. Federal,
state, and local governments have incurred escalating recurrent
budgetary commitments for staff salaries and emoluments as a result
of relentless growth in the size of all public service ranks. Today,
the federal and state services jointly employ more than 700,000
persons. In comparison, the number of established positions in the
federal and regional bureaucracies totaled 71,693 in 1960. The total
number of higher officers in the federal and state services also
increased dramatically from an estimated 763 in 1964 to roughly
50,000 ten years later. Between 1966 and 1977, the number of public
enterprises (utilities, banks, commercial and industrial operations)
grew from about 70 to 300. The armed forces consisted of an addi-
tional 250,000 personnel in 1978. A nation-wide manpower survey
based on 1978-79 local government estimates identified roughly
386,000 established positions at the local government level-excluding
59general labors as well as district, village, and hamlet heads.
With the inclusion of local government staff alone, the total
personnel strength of the Nigerian public bureaucracy swells to over
a million--undoubtedly the largest in sub-saharan Africa. At the
same time a 1977 government study of Nigeria's manpower requirements
placed the level of staff vacancies for most higher and intermediate
level scientific and technical posts at between 40 and 55 percent
and reported a 15 to 30 percent vacancy rate in administrative and
h h · 1 " 60ot er non-tee nlca posltlons.
Rapid bureaucratic expansion continues to provide ample
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advancement opportunities for career public servants. In addition,
the numerous vacancies and acting appointments that result from
perpetual growth are cited to bolster the questionable thesis often
propounded in government circles that "a shortage of experience,
skilled manpower, or inadequate executive capacity, constitutes the
principal constraint on Nigeria's development". 6l It is at least
equally convincing to argue that the costs associated with persistent
bureaucratic expansion have foreclosed the pursuit of other development
options that promise greater benefits for the majority of citizens who
do not hold government jobs.
Furthermore, the proportions of the new capital investment expen-
ditures authorized in recent years at all levels of government have
been devoted to the construction of staff housing and office buildings,
and to the purchase of imported, labor saving machinery and equipment
used exclusively for administrative convenience. The establishment
of twelve states out of the four former regions in 1967, the develop-
ment of seven additional state capitals in 1976, and the creation of
numerous new local government units under the 1976 reform edicts and
following the return to civilian rule have required massive outlays
of public funds for the employment of locally based staff, the
construction of new headquarters and staff residences, and the
provision of basic infrastructural facilities and elite services.
Expensive 'development' projects have tended to emphasize the same
kinds of recurrent overhead expenditures. Devotion to such consi-
derations has allowed project staffs to emerge as one of the few
domestic beneficiaries of the capital intensive, large scale
irrigation schemes launched by the Federal Military Government in
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the early 1970s for the avowed purpose of increasing domestic food
production.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE FUTURE OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
The Nigerian public service is a relic of the British colonial
administration in that it mimics-although imperfectly-the pl'ocesses,
practices and structures of the Whitehall system. When Nigeria
became independent in 1960, it did not set up new administrative
machinery in place of the former British system. Instead, the
administrative structure set up by the colonial master influenced the
patterns of administration under the new regime. The colonial tradi-
tion of neutrality of the public service gave theoretical support for
the preservation of colonial administrative structures and personnel
in the process of transition from dependence to independence. Indeed,
the process of political change that led to independence placed
political and bureaucratic power in the hands of persons of same
backgrounds and loyalties. There was no split between party and
bureaucracy as such, and political leaders were more dependent on
the civil bureaucracy because of their monopoly of technical expertise,
scarcity of competing social elites and until the 1966 coup, the
political insignificance of the military forces.
Though there have been shifts in bureaucratic policy making roles
and relationships at various times along the lines of political,
structural and constitutional changes, the persistence of the
inherited structural arrangement has enabled extensive bureaucratic
involvement in policy formulation. advocacy and execution. Other
factors also adduced for the consistent involvement of the
bureaucrats in policy formulation (espec.ially during the First
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Republic) are the lack of basic education on the part of the political
bosses, role relations with members of the public that tend to hinder
bureaucratic performance, and the decision making inherent in the
system.
With the advent of the military into the Nigerian politics came
a deeper involvement of the bureaucrats into policy formulating roles.
The lack of experience on the part of most military officers with
governmental processes and public decision making, coupled with a
reluctance to appoint former politicians to authoritative or
advisory posts, and the absence of any organized public constituency,
made the military administration dependent upon the policy advice
and alternatives offered by civil servants.
During the Second Republic, an attempt was made to place
political control over bureaucracy through the constitution. Several
provisions of the constitution undermined the formal standing of
bigher civil servants in policy formulation and execution. Most
significantly, the constitution altered the status of the higher
public bureaucrats by allowing elected chief executives to appoint
individuals from outside the career civil service as permanent
secretaries. Variations also emerged in governments appointment
policies and practices, staffing patterns and administrative rule
making and interpretation.
Nevertheless, as a result of the widely varying roles and the
consistency of their central position in policy formulation, the
bureaucrats have been cited as a cohesive and effective institution
dedicated to promoting stability and national unity. An alternative
interpretation of their motive has characterized the institution as
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being "parasitic". The higher administrative and professional
officers have been accused of consistently emerging as the principle
beneficiaries of policy execution and program implementation. Despite
their commitment to the concept of a strong and effective central
government, it is suggested that the administrators have further
entrenched the elite economic standing and expanded their profit
making opnortunities.
THE FUTURE OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
What is the probable future of the civil service in Nigeria? Will
the civil bureaucracy continue to enjoy a virtual monopoly of actual
day-to-day power and prestige in society, ruling in behalf of the one-
party political or military regimes as they did in behalf of the
no-party regimes of colonialism? Or will new groups emerge to threaten
their status? In large part the answer depends on whether the
bureaucrats can maintain their own unity. Their technical competence
makes them almost indispensable. If they stick together on any basis
except overt and general resistance to political directives, their
position is virtually unassailable. On the other hand, if they split
on age, class, ethnic or political lines, this will enable other social
forces to take control, forces which would, of course, have to retain
many or most civil servants in their jobs but would subject them to
control from outside the civil services, in accord with nonbureaucratic
norms.
One source of cleavage in the bureaucracy is a heritage of the
British system, which unlike the civil service system of the United
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States, makes a sharp distinction between the administrative class
and other civil servants, including high-ranking technicians. Hany
of those who have risen as far as they can go through the technical
ranks of the civil service are increasingly resentful to find their
paths to further advancement blocked by ~.;rhat seem to be, in African
context, a meaningless class distinction. The administrators (who
are supposed to hold liberal arts degrees) control the positions of
permanent secretary, permanent undersecretary, and the like in all
departments and, unlike the technical personnel, do not remain within
one department but are shifted about as the occasion and opportunities
for advancement dictate. The problem is aggravated by the fact that
many technicians are better trained than their administrative
superiors, who are often glorified clerks carried into high posts by
rapid Nigerianization of the public service.
The constraints that have been placed in recent years upon
participation by career public servants in the policy making process
have. stemmed primarily from criticism of bureaucratic objectives and
policy outcomes. Although senior public administrators have
undeniably 'overreached' their conventional roles on various occasions,
especially under Gowon regime, extensive bureaucratic involvement in
determining public policy generally is viewed as inevitable and even
informally sanctioned. The chief impetus for the backlash against
the bureaucracy has been the increasingly pervasive and blatant
manner in which career officials have 'discredited' themselves through
virtual single-minded devotion to their own vested interests. In
addition, increases in bureaucratic size, power, and pecuniary
rewards have not been accompanied by noticeable improvements in the
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performance of public servants or gains in public sector productivity.
As a matter of fact, neither the reputation nor the morale of
public servants has recovered much since the 1975 mass purge. The
sweeping purge and the new institutions introduced by the Murta1a/
Obasanjo administration have had no discernable beneficial long-term
impact on bureaucratic performance. Adamo1ekun concludes that
"the balance sheet of all these new measures suggests that no qualita-
tive change has occurred in . . the behavior and performance of the
public servants".62 The military neither introduced a disciplinary
(or reward) scheme systematically related to personnel behavior and
performance nor replaced dismissed civil servants with a new
institutional core of progressive development administrators.
In conclusion, a technically competent, sophisticated, efficient
professional cadre dedicated to the competent operation of the bureau-
cratic organization is the sine qua non of any modern state. In the
words of H. Finer,
The function of the civil service in the
modern state is not merely the improvement
of government; without it indeed, government
itself would be impossible. 63
The outcome of continued technological and social development for
the role of government in society tends to indicate that such a civil
service would remain an indispensable component of governments in the
future. \;Jhat is in dispute. however, are the proper limits of the
role of the civil service in the affairs of the state, and the
conditions under which the institution can more effectively serve
the larger interests of its society rather than its narrow institu-
tional interests.
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In the conventional administrative thought, the civil service
is an instrument for both policy and implementation of the will of
the state as determined by legitimate political institutions to
which the service must be both subordinate and subservient. Indeed,
Max TfTeber Ttlarned that the subjection of the civil service to
political control is necessary to prevent the institution from
becoming a master rather than the servant of society as well as for
ensuring the effective discharge of its functions. 64 Fred Riggs'
"strong constitutive" system has the same supervisory and control
jurisdiction over civil service functioning as Weber's political
h . 65aut orlty. The modus operandi of civil service in such a system
is such that would insulate it from blame when government policies
misfire while allowing it a share of the credit for successful public
policies.
Against the conventional wisdom is the Development Administration
perspective which, in addition to the traditional role of the civil
service, seeks a wider and more prominent role for it in the goal-
setting processes. Identifying economic development as the goal of
emergent states and attributing to their bureaucracies a capacity for
initiating and managing development that is unmatched by any group of
elites, development administration makes the effectiveness of the
civil service contingent not upon extra-civil service control but
upon unfettered opportunities to apply its creative talents and
capabilities. In the words of Milton J. Esman,
The emphasis on control of bureaucracy in the
context of most of the developing countries is
a misplaced priority, one that might seriously
retard their rate of progress. We ought to be
much more concerned with increasing the capacity
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of the bureaucracy to perform, and this we
see as a function of greatly enhanced professional
capability and operational autonomy rather than
further controls. 66
Accordingly, this research paper is submitted with a view that
the common influence of the administrator over policy will continue
for as long as the basis and structure of politics in developing
countries retains the 'culture of poverty'. To bring about changes,
there must exist modernity which Lamond Tullis defined as the "process
whereby men adjust themselves in terms of politics, society and
culture so that they can develop their environment economically.,,67
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